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An actual cause of some token effect is itself a (distinct) token event (or fact, or state of affairs, 
…) that helped to bring about that effect. The notion of an actual cause is different from that of 
a potential cause – for example a pre-empted backup – which had the capacity to bring about the 
effect, but which wasn't in fact operative on the occasion in question. Sometimes actual causes are 
also distinguished from mere background conditions: as when we judge that the struck match was a 
cause of the fire, while the presence of oxygen was merely part of the relevant background 
against which the struck match operated. Actual causation is also to be distinguished from type 
causation: actual causation holds between token events in a particular, concrete scenario; type 
causation, by contrast, holds between event kinds in scenario kinds.1 
 Modern philosophical study of actual causation dates back to Hume (1739-1740), with 
Mill (1843), Mackie (1965), and Lewis (1973) making field-defining contributions to the subject. 
While the late twentieth century saw vibrant debate concerning actual causation, there has been a 
particular surge of interest since the turn of the millennium. One of the key reasons for this has 
been an increased awareness among philosophers of the availability of formal tools – in 
particular structural equation models and causal graphs – that can fruitfully be brought to bear in the 
development of novel solutions to traditional problems confronting attempts to analyze actual 
causation. Books by Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines (1993/2000) and Pearl (2000/2009) have 
been key in bringing these formal tools to the attention of philosophers, with seminal attempts 
to analyze actual causation using these tools having been made by Pearl (2000, Ch. 10), Halpern 
and Pearl (2001), Hitchcock (2001), and Woodward (2003, esp. pp. 74-86). Over the subsequent 
decade or so, this tradition has been greatly enriched by further contributions, including those of 
Menzies (2004), Halpern and Pearl (2005), Glymour and Wimberly (2007), Hitchcock (2007a), 
Halpern (2008), and Halpern and Hitchcock (2010, ms.). 
 Though these structural equation approaches to the analysis of actual causation have 
been highly influential, there continues to be a healthy diversity of alternative approaches that are 	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1 The term 'actual causation' became firmly established in the philosophical lexicon with Pearl 
(2000). It has, however, been used extensively in the tort law literature for some time (see e.g. 
Wright 1985). The term refers to a relation that philosophers often used to (and sometimes still 
do) call 'token causation'. In his contribution to this volume, Christopher Hitchcock argues that 
'actual causation' is less misleading than 'token causation' when deployed as a term for that 
token-level causal relation that has been the standard target of philosophical analysis. This is 
because, Hitchcock argues, the standard target of philosophical analysis is not the only kind of 
token-level causal relation. In their contributions, Max Kistler and David Danks also suggest that 
actual and token causation should not be equated. 
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pursued. Structural equations are standardly understood as representing relations of non-
backtracking counterfactual dependence between events (or rather, variables representing those 
events).2 Such approaches can thus be seen as one branch of the tradition, initiated by Lewis 
(1973), of attempts to analyze actual causation in counterfactual terms. But, on the one hand, not 
all of those who have implemented the structural equation framework to analyze causation have 
done so against the background of a counterfactual understanding of causation,3 and, on the 
other, not all of those who have recently pursued counterfactual accounts of actual causation 
have done so within the structural equation framework (see, e.g., Yablo 2004, and 
Ramachandran 2004).4 There is a healthy diversity of rivals to the counterfactual approach. 
These include process (or transference) accounts (such as that developed by Dowe 2000, 2004), 
mechanisms approaches (which include the seminal contribution of Machamer, Darden, and 
Craver 2000), probabilistic approaches (including Kvart 2004 and Glynn 2011), regularity 
approaches (including Graßhoff and May 2001, Baldwin and Neufeld 2004, Strevens 2007, and 
Baumgartner 2008; cp. also Halpern 2008, Section 5), and realist approaches (including Mumford 
and Anjum 2011, or Chakravartty 2005). 
 Structural equations are a particular representational device: as noted, they are normally 
construed as representing relations of non-backtracking counterfactual dependence, relations to 
which actual causation is reducible according to the counterfactual analyst. Since they are readily 
able to represent rather subtle patterns of counterfactual dependence (including de facto or 
explicitly non-foretracking counterfactual dependence5), they are much vaunted for their heuristic 
value in facilitating the development of new and sophisticated counterfactual analyses of 
causation. Nevertheless, there is a lively discussion concerning the question of which is the most 
felicitous and fecund device for representing causal structures. Lewis (1986) first proposed 
'neuron' diagrams as a device for representing the relations of counterfactual dependence in 
terms of which he sought to analyze causation. Hall (2007) discusses the merits, and some of the 
limitations, of their use, while Hitchcock (2007b, 2009) has argued for the superiority of 
structural equations and causal graphs. Alternative devices for representing causal relationships 
have been proposed by philosophers working in other traditions: for instance, Mumford and 
Anjum (2011) criticize neuron diagram representations as being ideologically biased: specifically, 
they argue that neuron diagrams are conducive to a Humean ontology, which they reject in favor 
of realism about causal powers. They argue that causal powers are better represented as vectors. 
 Another interesting aspect of the recent literature on actual causation concerns the 
question of whether the traditional philosopher's project of attempting to understand actual 
causation by providing putative necessary and sufficient conditions, which are then compared to 
intuitions concerning a battery of test cases, is a fruitful pursuit. Glymour et al. (2010) argue that 
such an enterprise is bound to fail. In particular, they argue that standard test cases are inevitably 
very simple, and constitute only a tiny proportion of a huge number of possible causal structures 
that cannot be surveyed by intuitions. What is worse, many interestingly novel causal features  
only appear in structures of considerably higher complexity than the standard test cases. (Neuron 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 On the notion of non-backtracking counterfactual dependence – which is the variety of 
counterfactual dependence in terms of which philosophers have attempted to analyze actual 
causation – see Lewis (1979). 
3  Indeed it is possible to construe structural equations as representing things other than 
counterfactual dependence relations: for example, Pearl (2000) speaks of them as representing 
mechanisms; while Baldwin and Neufeld (2004) speak of them as representing law-like regularities. 
They are thus found to be useful tools even by some who expound non-counterfactual accounts 
of actual causation (e.g. Hiddleston 2005, or Handfield et al. 2008).	  
4 Hall (2007) provides a counterfactual account of causation that he thinks can, but need not be, 
presented within the structural equation framework. 
5 These terms are due respectively to Yablo (2004) and Hitchcock (2001). 
Michael Baumgartner & Luke Glynn 
	   3	  
diagram and, especially, structural equation representations are apt to suggest such novel 
features.) In place of the standard philosophical method – traceable to Plato – of conceptual (or 
metaphysical) analysis, they advocate a more mathematical, Euclidean, axiomatic method, 
consisting in the provision of principles that serve as reliable indicators for discovering actual 
causal relations. These principles or axioms are justified to the extent that they are fruitful in 
allowing for causal generalization, inference, control, etc. The idea is that such a set of axioms 
will reproduce the basic tenets of our causal reasoning, at the same time showing why it is useful 
for us to have a concept of actual cause that accords with these principles. Along the way, it is 
hoped that the content of our concept of actual causation will be illuminated. But the criterion 
of success in this project is not the provision of a reductive definition of actual cause that 
captures ordinary intuitions about all cases. The prescription of minor conceptual revisions, and 
explication rather than reduction, are not considered deadly sins on such an approach.6  
 As shall be explained below, each of these various strands of the current debate 
concerning actual causation is discussed in articles that this special issue comprises. The special 
issue is the result of a workshop on actual causation organized at the University of Konstanz in 
September 2010. The workshop was organized in the context of the 'Causality and Probability' 
project, which ran from 2009-2012. This was a collaborative project involving philosophers at 
Konstanz and at the Institut d'Histoire et de Philosophie des Sciences et des Techniques (IHPST) in Paris. 
The IHPST side of the project was directed by Jacques Dubucs and funded by L'Agence Nationale 
de la Recherche (ANR). The Konstanz side was directed by Wolfgang Spohn and funded by the 
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) under the grant SP279/15-1, which also funded the 
workshop. The editors of this special issue were both employed as post-doctoral researchers at 
Konstanz, within the context of the project, at the time of the workshop. 
 The workshop brought together a number of world-leading researchers who have made 
significant contributions to recent work on actual causation. The articles collected in this issue 
grew out of talks given at that workshop, and advance the debate on actual causation in a 
number of directions. What follows is a summary of the articles, with some connections drawn 
between them. 
In the article entitled 'Metaphysically Reductive Causation', Ned Hall and L. A. Paul 
argue that the project of seeking a metaphysical reduction of actual causation is of significant 
philosophical value and interest. They defend the value and interest of such a project vis-à-vis 
some other projects that might be pursued in the philosophy of actual causation, such as non-
reductive explication of the actual causal relation, Fregean-style conceptual analysis, or an analysis of 
the function that the concept of cause serves in the human cognitive economy. (The latter sort of 
project is pursued by David Danks in his contribution to this special issue.) Hall and Paul 
provide a set of rules, or methodological maxims, that they argue ought to guide the 
development of a metaphysically reductive account of causation. This allows them to provide a 
principled and systematic evaluation of the most significant accounts currently on the market – 
namely, regularity accounts, counterfactual accounts (including their structural equation variants), 
probabilistic accounts, and transference accounts – in terms of the extent to which they satisfy 
these principles. One of their maxims is that one ought not to smuggle causal facts into the 
analysans of one's analysis. In discussing counterfactual accounts, and their structural equation 
variants, Hall and Paul emphasize that this means, among other things, that the semantics for the 
relevant counterfactuals must not appeal to causal facts. Whether structural equation accounts 
can get away with a non-causal semantics for counterfactuals is an issue that is further explored 
in Luke Glynn's contribution to this special issue. In giving examples, Hall and Paul make 
extensive use of neuron diagrams, and explain the basic conventions governing such 
representations, as well as some of the potential pitfalls of using neuron diagrams to represent 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 On the virtues of such an approach, see also Spirtes et al. (2000, pp. 3-4) and Woodward (2003, 
Ch. 1). 
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causal structures. 
In his contribution entitled 'Of Miracles and Interventions', Luke Glynn provides a 
detailed outline of the use of structural equations in representing counterfactual dependence 
relations, and also of the various accounts of actual causation that have been developed within 
the structural equation framework. Glynn examines an important foundational question 
concerning the appropriate semantics for the counterfactuals encoded by structural equations. A 
highly influential approach, due to Lewis (1979), has it that the counterfactuals relevant to 
causation are to be evaluated with respect to possible worlds in which their antecedents are 
realized by small miracles. This approach has been critiqued by Woodward (2003), whose rival, 
interventionist, semantics has gained a good deal of currency, especially among advocates of 
structural equation accounts of actual causation. Glynn defends Lewis's semantics against 
Woodward's criticisms, arguing that structural equation analyses of actual causation perform at 
least as well – in terms of extensional adequacy – when founded upon (a generalized version of) 
Lewis's semantics as when founded upon Woodward's. Moreover, Glynn argues that adopting 
the Lewisian semantics avoids certain circularities associated with Woodward's approach, and 
thus holds out the promise of reduction. 
In the paper entitled 'The Interventionist Account of Causation and Non-Causal 
Association Laws', Max Kistler also critiques Woodward's interventionist version of a structural 
equation analysis. This time the focus of the critique is on the extensional adequacy (rather than 
the non-reductivity) of Woodward's approach. Specifically, it is argued that Woodward's account 
does not have the resources for distinguishing between genuine causal relations and non-causal 
nomological associations. As an example of a non-causal association law, Kistler considers the 
'magnetic stirrer law', which relates the angular momentum (L) of a magnetic stirrer to its magnetic 
moment (µ). The variables L  and µ  are generic, in the sense that many different systems at many 
different times may each possess values for these variables. But Kistler observes that we can 
construct specific variables L(s, t) and µ(s, t) that represent the values of L  and µ  for a particular 
(token) magnetic stirrer, s, at a particular time, t. Kistler argues that an experimental manipulation 
of the value of the particular stirrer's angular momentum, L(s, t) (that is, an intervention upon 
this variable), would (by the association law) change the value of its magnetic moment, µ(s, t), 
and that an intervention on its magnetic moment, µ(s, t), would change the value of its angular 
momentum, L(s, t). It follows, on Woodward's interventionist account, that L(s, t) is a cause of 
µ(s, t) and vice versa. But, Kistler observes, this is incompatible with the asymmetry of (token-
level) causation. Indeed, Kistler points out, if we additionally assume that causation is transitive, 
we will get the absurd result that µ(s, t) and L(s, t) each cause themselves. Consequently, Kistler 
argues that Woodward's interventionist analysis does not provide a sufficient condition for 
causation, but merely provides a condition that is (necessary and) sufficient for nomological 
dependence, a relation which is not asymmetric and which includes (not just causal dependence 
but also) dependence via a non-causal association law. Kistler ends his paper by suggesting that 
token-level causation between two variables might be analyzable in terms of the notion of 
nomological dependence together with that of a causal process. 
In his article 'A Regularity Theoretic Approach to Actual Causation', Michael 
Baumgartner develops a sophisticated regularity account of both type causation and actual 
causation, arguing that his account overcomes problems associated with classic regularity 
accounts, such as those of Mackie (1965) and Wright (1985). Baumgartner also argues that his 
account performs at least as well – in extensional adequacy terms – as sophisticated 
counterfactual accounts of actual causation that draw upon structural equations models. Indeed, 
he argues that his account is superior to certain structural equation analyses in its treatment of 
cases of so-called switching and short-circuiting. He also defends his account against a putative 
counterexample to regularity analyses offered by Hall (2004, p. 263). In fact, Baumgartner is able 
to appeal to many of the innovations and insights of the structural equations literature – such as 
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Hitchcock's (2001) notion of an active route and the deployment by Hitchcock (2007), Halpern 
(2008), and others of normality or typicality considerations – while setting them in the context of a 
regularity approach. Baumgartner argues that, in addition to performing at least as well as the 
best structural equation accounts, his regularity theoretic approach has the advantage of not 
appealing – as standard structural equation approaches do – to such baroque metaphysical and 
conceptual resources as non-actual possible worlds and explicitly non-foretracking counterfactuals. Thus, he 
argues, his account is preferable on grounds of parsimony. Indeed, Baumgartner argues that his 
account is thoroughly empiricist and free of modal notions: it appeals only to material 
conditionals, Boolean minimization procedures, and a (non-modal) stability condition 
concerning the behavior of causal models under expansions of the sets of analyzed factors. 
The starting point of the contribution entitled 'Functions and Cognitive Bases for the 
Concept of Actual Causation' by David Danks is an acknowledgement of the challenge that the 
arguments of Glymour et al. (2010) – which were described above – pose for traditional 
approaches to analyzing actual causation. In response, Danks advocates a different approach: 
namely one that seeks to examine the principles that generate judgments about actual causation. 
The aim of such an approach is to shed light upon the concept of actual causation, without 
(necessarily) providing necessary and sufficient conditions for its application. Danks advocates 
two (complementary) methods – each distinct from the standard practice of intuition-mining, 
and surveying test cases – that may fruitfully be pursued with a view to eliciting such general 
principles. The first is an analysis of the functional role that the concept of causation plays in the 
human cognitive economy: for example, the role that it plays in supporting explanation, 
prediction, and control. The idea is to attempt to cast light upon the content of our concept of 
actual causation by examining the role the concept plays for us and why we have the concept in 
the first place. The second method that Danks advocates involves an exploration of the 
cognitive mechanisms that underlie our experiences of, and judgments and reasoning about, 
actual causation. The idea is that we can thereby learn something about the scope and 
application of our concept of actual causation. Danks takes some initial steps toward 
implementing these two methods (the second of which he pursues by means of a detailed 
analysis of results from experimental psychology concerning actual causal perception). He argues 
that the results, even of these preliminary attempts to implement his two proposed methods, are 
some interesting insights into the concept of actual causation: specifically, Danks argues, they 
show that it is a concept of a relation that is graded, context-sensitive, and extrinsic. 
 Finally, in his article entitled 'What is the "Cause" in Causal Decision Theory?',  
Christopher Hitchcock is concerned with the role that causation plays in other philosophically 
interesting phenomena – rational decision-making, in particular. Noting that counterfactual 
theories of causation face serious problems with cases of preemption and (symmetric) 
overdetermination, Hitchcock points out that we should expect that such cases will pose 
problems for counterfactual theories of various other causally-involved phenomena too. 
Hitchcock illustrates this by describing how simple counterfactual theories of three such 
phenomena – memory, free will/moral responsibility, and dispositions – have succumbed to 
counterexamples involving pre-emption and overdetermination. (Examples could obviously be 
multiplied: see for instance Lewis's (1980, pp. 248-9) rather odd attempt to dismiss what seems 
to be a clear preemption-involving counterexample to his own counterfactual analysis of seeing.)  
Yet Hitchcock argues that rational decision is an exception to this. Causal decision theory takes 
rational decision-making to be a causal notion and, on a standard formulation, analyzes rational 
decision-making in terms of counterfactuals. This would lead us to expect counterexamples to 
causal decision theory involving cases of pre-emption and symmetric overdetermination. But, 
Hitchcock argues, we do not find such counterexamples. Hitchcock concludes that the 'cause' in 
causal decision theory is a causal notion that admits of a simple counterfactual analysis, and 
therefore can't be the same causal notion that is the standard target for philosophical analyses, 
including standard counterfactual analyses. That is, it can't be the notion of actual cause. Since the 
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notion of cause involved in causal decision theory is nevertheless (like the notion of actual 
causation) a singular, or token-level causal notion, Hitchcock holds that it would be wrong to 
simply equate actual causation with token causation. Rather, what is distinctive about actual 
causation is that it is retrospective: it is the notion that is involved in after-the-fact attributions of 
causal responsibility. The notion of causation that is involved in causal decision theory, by 
contrast, is prospective: it involves reasoning from causes to their effects.7 Hitchcock explains why 
both of these causal concepts are valuable to us. 
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